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  Standard analysis of racial inequality incorporates racial classification as an exogenous 
binary variable. This approach obfuscates the importance of racial self-identity and clouds our 
ability to understand the relative importance of unobserved productivity-linked attributes versus 
market discrimination as determinants of racial inequality in labor market outcomes. Our 
examination of identity heterogeneity among African Americans suggests racial wage disparity 
is most consistent with weak colorism, while genotype disparity best describes racial 
employment differences. Further, among African Americans, the wage data are not consistent 
with the hypothesis that black-mixed race wage disparity can be explained by differences in 
unobserved productivity-linked productive attributes.  
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Standard econometric analysis of African American – white inequality incorporates racial 
classification as an exogenous binary variable. However, a white/black dichotomous variable in 
the earnings equation may be inappropriate since a rising proportion of African Americans self-
identify as both black and white, black and white and some other racial category, or black and 
some other racial category. Also, the exogenous binary approach obfuscates the relative 
importance of unobserved skill versus market discrimination as casual determinants of racial 
wage inequality.  
This paper examines identity differences and labor market disparity among African 
Americans and between African Americans and whites. The increase in identity differences 
among African Americans provides an opportunity for appraising the relative importance of 
acculturation and discrimination for inter- and intra-racial wage disparity. Section I reviews the 
existing literature on racial identity and labor market outcomes. Section II presents the empirical 
model and hypotheses, while section III discusses the data and section IV presents the results. 
We conclude with a discussion and summary of the results. 
I. Literature Review  
   Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006) present racial identity formation as an evolutionary 
game. For this model, self-identification and labeling conventions are norms that emerge to 
determine differential degrees of access to private and social resources within and between social 
groups. If a racialized equilibrium exists, racial conventions are fashioned to limit entry into the 
wealthiest social group.
1  
  In a racialized economy, transracial acculturation is an individualist social innovation. It 
is difficult for this innovation to spread and dislodge the racialized equilibrium because 
acculturation reduces participation in own-group benefits and increases the cost borne by   2 
individualists due to other-group antagonism. Yet, if there are differential rates of return to social 
group identity some individuals may attempt identity arbitrage, that is, to find a mechanism that 
allows transracial acculturation into the group with the higher rate of return to social identity.   
Historically, “passing” and “acting white” have been two forms of transracial 
acculturation available to African Americans.
2 “Passing” occurs when Euro-phenotype persons 
of African descent covertly adopt a white racial identity. If there is a relatively large economic 
payoff to whiteness, there will be strong incentives for European-featured Africans to identity as 
white. Passing was particularly popular between the 1850s and 1940s, but appears to be much 
less prevalent today (Sollors, 1996). 
“Acting white” permits transracial acculturation for some African Americans who are 
otherwise unable to “pass”. For instance, although mixed-race self-classification maybe an 
idiosyncratic consumption good, it is also true that mixed-race self-identification can be an 
individualistic transracial acculturation strategy that seeks to arbitrage the differences in 
economic disparity associated with market and social premia obtained by white-only individuals 
relative to black-only individuals. Consequently, a mixed-race self-identity strategy may not get 
a person into an advantaged group (e.g., white-only in the US) but it may allow an individual to 
more or less successfully distance himself from a disadvantaged group (e.g., black-only in the 
US).
3 
Colorism is a discriminatory process whereby the extent of racial disparity varies by skin 
shade, phenotype, or racial self-identification (Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity, 2007). Strict 
colorism exists when the extent of racial disparity against African Americans decreases 
monotonically as racial self-classification changes from black-only to black-white to white-only. 
Weak colorism implies that self-identified mixed-race persons may experience differential   3 
market payoffs relative to black-only African Americans, but there is not a monotonic change in 
disparity as race self-classification changes from black-only to black-white to white-only.  
    Identity differences among African Americans were widespread during the 19th century. 
In their analysis of 1860 census data of the urban South, Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003) found 
that mixed-race persons, “mulattoes,” often had economic incentives to distinguish themselves 
from blacks. By rejecting blackness and “acting white” it was sometimes possible for mulattoes 
to obtain better education, higher occupational status, and greater wealth accumulation 
(Bodenhorn and Ruebeck, 2007). Simply separating themselves from black-only or darker 
African Americans was not sufficient for mulattoes to achieve greater socioeconomic wellbeing, 
the separation also had to occur in a context whereby it was beneficial to whites. Further, the 
advantages of mixed-race identity varied by region and by the demographic composition of the 
population. 
   Mixed-race individuals of the Lower South (and the Caribbean) were most frequently the 
children of affluent white males and (free or enslaved) black women; hence, they secured 
advantages not available to individuals who were black-only, for example, manumission, some 
degree of education, and inheritance from fathers. (See Bodenhorn, 2003 and accompanying 
references). Mixed-race persons of the Upper South were most frequently the children of poor 
white males and enslaved black women. Hence, the mulatto-black economic differential in the 
Upper South may have been less extensive than the mulatto-black economic differential in the 
Lower South. 
   Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2007) confirm a pattern of strict colorism in the 1860 Urban 
South. They found that black and mixed-race male heads of household accumulate 92 and 45 
percent less wealth, respectively, than otherwise identical whites. Similarly, black and mulatto   4 
female heads of household accumulate 106 and 63 percent less wealth, respectively, than 
otherwise identical whites. Similarly, in an analysis of 23 counties in rural Virginia Bodenhorn 
(1999) reports that black-white males attained an average terminal stature of 68.5 inches 
compared to a terminal stature of just 67.1 inches for dark males, while black-white women 
were, on average, more than 2 inches taller than dark complexion women.  
   For their analysis of contemporary colorism, Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity (2007) 
utilize samples from the 1979-80 National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA) and the Multicity 
Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI).
4 For both datasets, Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity find 
evidence that is consistent with weak skin shade colorism. In particular, African Americans as a 
whole suffer a market penalty relative to whites but the penalty for lighter African Americans is 
lower than the penalty for medium and darker shade African Americans; there is no statistically 
significant difference between the penalties for the latter two groups.
5  
  Hersch (2006) also uses the NSBA and finds no statistically significant skin shade effects 
for women. Hersch‟s point estimates suggest that very dark and medium complexion African 
American males have hourly wage penalties of -0.21 log points relative to lighter complexion 
African American males, while the differential for dark black males is -0.18 log points. Hence, 
for Hersch (2006) there is weak colorism among African American males. 
   The 2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS) has greater and more precise information on skin 
shade than other large datasets (Hersch, 2007). Interviewers were provided with a color scale 
which consists of a series of hands with color increasing in darkness. Skin color was reported on 
a scale of 0 to 10. Regardless of nation of origin, all immigrants received a skin shade 
assessment. For a wage equation which contains a standard set of covariates (including English 
skills) and occupational controls to account for unobserved productivity variables, Hersch finds   5 
that each one point increase in skin tone scale lowers wages by 1.5 percent. The lightest skin 
immigrants earn 17 percent more than otherwise comparable immigrants with darker skin color, 
a pattern of strict colorism. 
  Empirical evidence suggests that the lower labor market penalty for light skin African 
Americans is not due to superior social capital, as defined by family background and current 
neighborhood characteristics. Controlling for family background and current neighborhood has 
no impact on coefficients of the MCSUI regressions, but raises the coefficient for light skin 
African Americans by 0.02 log points in the NSBA regressions (Goldsmith, et al., 2007). The 
lower labor market penalty for light skin African Americans is not due to superior occupational 
attainment. Controlling for occupation reduces the wage penalty by 0.02 log points for the 
MCSUI regressions, but has no effect on the coefficient for light skin African Americans in the 
NSBA regressions.  
   Ruebeck, Averett, and Bodenhorn (2006) compare the risky behaviors and academic 
success of non-Hispanic white, black, and black-white biracial youth. Ruebeck, et al. seek to 
empirically examine the behavioralist framework of “acting white” to generate hypotheses 
regarding “acting out” by youth of alternative social groups. Within the behavioralist framework, 
acting white is not an individualist attempt at transracial acculturation. Rather, for Fordham and 
Ogbu (1986) the acting white perspective is constructed on the notion that African American 
youth are anti-intellectual while white youth are academically oriented. Hence, blacks who are 
studious are violating group cultural prescriptions and therefore are perceived as “acting white.” 
Studious African American students will then be punished by the anti-intellectual black majority. 
There is no punishment for whites who are studious. Per Fordham and Ogbu, African 
Americans‟ anti-intellectual culture is to a greater or less extent responsible for the black-white   6 
gap in academic achievement and therefore, also, the black-white gap in labor market outcomes. 
If self-identified biracial youth wish to establish that they are authentically black then they too 
will adopt an anti-intellectual (or, more politely, “oppositional”) culture. Specifically, Ruebeck, 
et al. hypothesize that self-identified bi-racial youth and black youth are more likely to “act out” 
and high achieving (that is, high GPA) bi-racial and black youth will be even more likely to “act 
out” as a compensating mechanism for being high achievers within a group that has an anti-
intellectual culture. 
Ruebeck, et al. find no evidence to support the behavioralist version of the “acting white” 
hypothesis, finding instead evidence that is directly contradictory to the behavioralist 
perspective. Ruebeck, et al. go on to conclude that the evidence suggests that self-identified bi-
racial youth are constructing an identity that is neither black nor white.   
Ferguson (2006) also suggests that the data is inconsistent with the behavioral economics 
understanding that there is an “acting white” phenomena related to anti-academic achievement 
attitudes among African Americans. Instead, in agreement with the Darity, et al. model, 
Ferguson‟s results show that to the extent African American youth label another African 
American youth as “acting white” it‟s because the student is quite literally acting white, that is, 
frequently listening to “white” music or speaking in a manner similar to whites. The recent paper 
by Tyson, Darity, and Castellino (2005) also concludes that the behavioral economics‟ “acting 
white” hypothesis is not valid. Instead, Tyson, et, al. argue that regardless of race all high 
achieving students are to some extent labeled “nerds” or “geeks.”  
II. Estimation Framework 
   Consider the following equation of racial inequality.   










e eD  + t + .   7 
  The wage covariates (captured by the vector X) include potential experience and its 
square; years of education and its square; interaction terms for years of education and experience 
and years of education and experience squared; union status of job; regional binary variables 
(Northeast, Northeast, West), where South is the comparison region; marital status binary 
variables (married, divorced, widowed, separated), where never-married persons are the 
comparison group; number of unmarried children at home less than 18 years of age; binary 
variable for whether or not an individual has served in the armed forces; individual/family 
unearned income ($1,000s); state employment-population rate; binary variable if there is a 
limitation on the amount or type of work; binary variables for small localities (cities with 
100,000 or fewer persons) and large cities (metropolitan areas with 5,000,000 or more 
individuals); dichotomous variable for Hispanic status; and, whether or not an individual is an 
immigrant. 
    A linear trend variable (t) captures intertemporal changes in the labor market effects of 
technological change,  the impact of governmental policies, etc..  
    Identity differences are captured by the vector De, whose elements are defined as follows: 
De  black-only; black-American Indian, black-Native American, black-Asian, or  
        black-Native American; black-white-American Indian, black-white-Native American,  
        black-white-Asian, or black-white-Native American; black-white. 
i) Colorism: disparity and self-identity 
  Our null hypothesis is H0: 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 0.  
Weak or strict colorism exists according to whether we reject the null hypothesis in favor 
of one of the following alternative hypotheses, that is, whether we have weak or strict evidence 
of an identity gradient.     8 
H1:  1     2    3   4   < 0 (weak colorism) 
H1:  1   <  2   < 3 < 4 < 0 (strict colorism)  
Similarly, either weak or strict genotype disparity exists according to whether we reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of one of the following alternative hypotheses. 
H1: 1  0, 2  0, 3  0, 4  0 (weak genotype disparity) 
H1: 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 < 0 (strict genotype disparity) 
    We first separately examine weekly wages for men and women, for both national and 
regional specifications of the wage equation. Next, we separately examine labor force 
participation and probability of employment for men and women, for both national and regional 
specifications of participation and employment equations. For both the wage and employment 
regressions, the comparative group consists of native-born Non-Hispanic whites. All immigrants 
and Hispanics in the data are African Americans. Finally, we restrict the sample to African 
Americans and utilize the Oaxca-Ransom decomposition to expose the nature and extent of intra-
racial inequality. 
    Regional differences in labor markets and the pattern of racial relations might also affect 
intra-racial differences in labor market outcomes. There has been unequal economic progress for 
African Americans across national regions. In particularly, there has been remarkable relative 
and absolute progress among African Americans in the South. If African Americans of differing 
identity are not similarly distributed across national regions, then we are likely to observe 
unequal progress for African Americans by self-identification.   
III. Data 
    The data are taken from the 2003 – 2007 March files of the Current Population Survey. 
The weekly wages refer to the average weekly wages for the year prior to the survey. All   9 
individuals are 16 – 64 years of age during the wage year. Employment status outcomes include 
employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force. Potential experience = max{age of individual 
– years of education – 6, 0}. Self-employment patterns differ across groups. We do not delete the 
self-employed, despite the fact that their wages may be difficult to determine precisely even as 
their employment status is straightforwardly ascertained. All individuals are either African 
Americans or native-born Non-Hispanic whites. All income data are inflation-adjusted to 2007 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers.  
   For 2003 – 2007 individuals may select more than one racial category. In order to 
maintain consistency with previous surveys and with the prevailing social norms of the 
immediate post-Jim Crow era, African Americans include all persons who self-identified as 
“black only” plus any combination of black and other racial or ethnic group.  
    Table 1 shows that, nationally, the overwhelming majority of African Americans self-
identify as black-only (hereafter, referred to as “black”). Just 3 percent of African Americans 
self-identify as mixed-race: 1.65 percent are black-white, 0.86 percent are black-American 
Indian, black-Asian, or black-Hawaiian (hereafter, collectively referred to as “black-other”), and 
the remainder (0.39 percent) self-identify as black-white-American Indian, black-white-Native 
Alaskan, black-white-Asian, or black-white-Native Hawaiian (hereafter, collectively referred to 
as “black-white-other”). At more than 8 percent, the West has the largest fractions of self-
identified mixed-race persons and the South had the fewest (just 1.7 percent). While the fraction 
of black-white individuals hovers around 1 – 2 percent in all other regions (with the lowest 
percentage in the South), this group represents almost 5 percent of the Western African 
American labor force. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2]   10 
Black-other and black-white-other persons have higher weekly wages ($687 and $682, 
respectively) than black and black-white individuals ($666 and $613, respectively). Fifty-six 
percent and 39 percent of black and black-other African Americans, respectively, live in the 
South. Black-white and Black-white-other persons are more evenly distributed throughout the 
country. Only 3.4 percent of blacks are Hispanic, but Hispanics are 10 percent, 25 percent, and 
28 percent of black-other, black-white-other, and black-white individuals. Eighty-eight percent 
of black and black-other African Americans are native-born, but 82 percent and 81 percent of 
black-white-other and black-white African Americans are native-born. There are important 
differences in the fraction of fulltime workers: black (81 percent), black-other (77 percent), and 
black-white-other (72 percent), and black-white (71 percent). Finally, black-other persons have 
the highest annual non-labor income ($3,037), while black-white persons have the lowest annual 
non-labor income ($1,792) with black and black-white-other individuals in between at $2,235 
and $2,301, respectively. 
IV. Results 
A. Weekly wage inequality: men 
    The empirical evidence regard male wage disparity is consistent with weak colorism. 
Table 3 shows that men who self-identified as black-white-other received an insignificant 2 
percent penalty in comparison to the 19 percent penalty received by African American men self-
identified as black. However, self-identified black-other men received a 23 penalty. Self-
identified black-white men received an 8 percent premium relative to native-born Non-Hispanic 
white men.  
  Table 3 shows regional outcomes that are substantively similar to the national patterns. 
Black males have wage penalties of 17 percent (Northeast), 19 percent (Northcentral and South),   11 
and 21 percent (West). Black-other males have wage penalties of 32 percent (Northeast), 30 
percent (Northcentral), 18 percent (South), and 21 percent (West). Northeastern black-white-
other men have a wage penalty of 27 percent; otherwise, there is no statistically significant wage 
effect for black-white-other men. Southern black-white men have a wage penalty of 11 percent; 
otherwise, there is no statistically significant wage effect for black-white men.   
 [Insert Table 3] 
Nationally, we reject the null hypotheses of an equal identity effect, no identity effect, no 
black effect, and no black-white effect. These results suggest that the coefficients for black and 
black-other are statistically indistinguishable, while the coefficients for black-white-other and 
black-white are statistically equal. In supplementary regressions, we created two binary 
variables, black-all (for black-only and black-other) and black-white-all (for black-white and 
black-white-other). The point estimates for black-all and black-white-all are -0.19 and -0.07, 
affirming a pattern of weak colorism. 
The Northcentral and Western regions are also consistent with a pattern of weak 
colorism. The black-all coefficients are -0.19 and -0.21, respectively, while the point estimates 
for black-white-all coefficients are statistically insignificant -0.05 and -0.04, respectively. In both 
cases, the standard errors for black-white-all yield broad 95 percent confidence intervals of  
(-0.1668, 0.0756) and (-0.1477, 0.0654) for the Northcentral and Western regions, respectively. 
By contrast, the black-all confidence intervals are much tighter, (-0.2127, -0.1697) and (-0.2412, 
-0.1813). 
   There are positive and equal identity effects for the Northeast, suggesting strict genotype 
disparity. Supplementary regressions show point estimates for black-all and black-white-all are -
0.17 and -0.13, with confidence intervals of (-0.1967, -0.1438) and (-0.2505, -0.0053),   12 
respectively. The South also reveals a pattern consistent with genotype disparity, but the large 
standard errors for black-white and black-white-other are also consistent with a pattern of weak 
colorism. Point estimates for black-all and black-white-all are -0.19 and -0.07, with confidence 
intervals of (-0.2020, -0.1727) and (-0.1876, 0.0421), respectively. 
B. Weekly wage inequality: women 
    There is evidence of weak colorism in the wage attainment process among African 
American women. Black women have a market penalty of 10 percent, while the penalty for 
black-other women is 13 percent (Table 4). There is a statistically insignificant penalty of 5 
percent for black-white-other women and a statistically insignificant premium of 1.17 percent for 
black-white women.  
 [Insert Table 4] 
  Regionally, black women earn 8 percent less (Northcentral), 9 percent less (Northeast and 
West), and 10 percent less (South) than otherwise identical native-born Non-Hispanic white 
women. There are no significant wage effects for either black-white women or black-white-other 
women. Except for the Southern penalty of 18 percent, there are no significant wage effects for 
black-other women. 
Nationally, we reject the null hypotheses of an equal identity effect, no identity effect, 
and no black effect. These results suggest that the coefficients for black and black-other are 
statistically indistinguishable, while the coefficients for black-white-other and black-white are 
statistically equal. In supplementary regressions, the point estimates for black-all and black-
white-all are -0.10 and 0.0004 (insignificant), a pattern of weak colorism. 
The point estimates for black-all are large and statistically significant in each of the 
regional regressions, while the coefficients for black-white-all are smaller (in absolute value) and   13 
statistically insignificant in each of the regional regressions: -0.09 and 0.03 (Northeastern), -0.08 
and -0.00 (Northcentral), -0.10 and 0.04 (South), and -0.09 and -0.06 (West). These patterns are 
consistent with weak colorism. Yet, for the Northcentral, Northeast, and West, the standard 
errors for the black-white-all coefficients are sufficiently large such that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of the coefficients of  the identity variables; hence, there is also evidence 
in favor the strict genotype hypothesis.  
C. Employment-status inequality: men 
    Nationally, the black male labor force participation rate is 1.2 percentage points less than 
the white male labor force participation rate (Table 5). The coefficients for black-other, black-
white, and black-white-other are statistically insignificant. Hypothesis tests show that the black 
and black-other coefficients are statistically equal and jointly significant. The black-white and 
black-white-other coefficients are not jointly significant.  
Supplementary regressions used only two binary identity variables: black-all, formed 
from combining black and black-other; and, black-white-all, formed from combining black-white 
and black-white-other. The point estimates show that black-all status reduces the probability of 
labor force participation by 1.2 percent, while black-white-all status reduces the probability of 
employment by a statistically insignificant 0.17 percent. A test of the null hypothesis that black-
all and black-white-all are jointly insignificant is rejected with a p-value = 0.0462. The null 
hypothesis for equality of the black-all and black-white-all coefficients is rejected with a p-value 
= 0.0000. 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6] 
  For every region, black males have marginally lower participation rates than white males. 
Participation effects are -1.5 percent (Northeast), -1.9 percent (Northcentral), -0.84 percent   14 
(South), -1.1 percent (West). For the Northcentral region, black-white men have a participation 
rate 2 percent higher than white males; otherwise, the black-white coefficient is insignificant. 
There are no significant regional participation differentials for black-other men. For the 
Northeast, black-white-other men have a participation rate 2.63 percent higher than white males; 
otherwise, the black-white-other coefficient is insignificant. 
  Black-all is statistically significant in the supplementary regression for each region and 
has an effect that is indistinguishable from the black coefficient. Except for the Northcentral 
region, the black-white-all coefficient is insignificant for each region. For the Northcentral 
region, black-white-all men have a participation that is 2.2 percent higher than the white 
participation rate. For the West, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that black-all and black-
white-other are jointly insignificant. For the South and Northeast, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients for black-all and black-white-all, though they are jointly 
significant; the point estimates for black-all men are -0.83 percent and -1.5 percent, respectively, 
while it is -0.61 percent and -0.57 percent, respectively, for black-white-all men.   
    Male employment is consistent with strict genotype disparity. Nationally, the black male 
probability of employment is 5 percentage points less than the white male probability of 
employment (Table 6). The coefficients for black-other and black-white-other are statistically 
insignificant. Black-white men are 3.5 percent less likely to be employed than otherwise 
identical white males. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that the identity coefficients are 
equal. But, we can reject the hypothesis that the identity coefficients are jointly insignificant. 
Supplementary regressions show a point estimate of -0.0491 for black-all men and -0.0300 for 
black-white-all men, with 95 percent confidence intervals of (-0.0553, -0.0428) and (-0.0574, -
0.0020), respectively.   15 
    For every region, black males have a lower probability of employment than white males. 
Employment effects are -6 percent (Northeast), -6 percent (Northcentral), -4 percent (South), and 
-6 percent (West). There are no statistically significant employment effects for black-other men 
in the Northeast and West; however, for the Northcentral and Southern regions black-other men 
are 12 percent and 4 percent, respectively, less likely to be employed that otherwise identical 
white males. There are no significant region effects for either black-white or black-white-other 
men. 
  Black-all is statistically significant in the supplementary regression for each region and has 
an effect that is indistinguishable from the black coefficient. Except for the South, the black-
white-all coefficient is insignificant for each region. However, except for the Northeast, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for black-all and black-white-all are equal; 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. These seemingly 
contradictory results occur because the large standard errors for black-white-all provide 95 
percent confidence intervals which encompass the confidence intervals for black-all. For the 
Northcentral region, the coefficients for both black-all and black-white-all reveal a 6 percent 
employment penalty. But, the confidence intervals are (-0.0786, -0.0414) and (-0.1343, 0.0123) 
for black-all and black-white-all men, respectively. For the South, the point estimates yield 
employment penalties of 4 percent (black-all) and 5 percent (black-white-all), but the confidence 
intervals are (-0.0443, -0.0294) and (-0.1126, 0.0050). For the West, the point estimates yield 
employment penalties of 6 percent (black-all) and 2 percent (black-white-all), but the confidence 
intervals are (-0.0828, -0.0393) and (-0.0693, 0.0255). 
D. Employment-status inequality: women 
    Nationally, there is no statistically significant labor force participation effect for black or   16 
mixed-race women (Table 7). Except for the Northeast, there are no significant participation 
effects for any group of African American women. Drawing on our supplementary regressions, 
black-white-all women residing in the Northeast have a 4 percent lower participation rate than 
otherwise identical white women.  
  Female employment is consistent with strict genotype disparity. Nationally and for each 
region, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal employment effects for black, black-other, 
black-white, and black-white-other women. The point estimates are sometimes quite different, 
but the large standard errors associated with the mixed-race coefficients yield overlapping 
confidence intervals. African American women are 3 – 4 percent less likely to obtain 
employment than otherwise identical white women. 
 [Insert Tables 7 and 8] 
E. Wage decompositions among African Americans 
Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) we use three equations to decompose intraracial 
wage differences: a pooled sample of all African Americans, a sub-sample of black African 
Americans, and a sub-sample of mixed-race African Americans.  
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  We focus on two issues regarding wage disparity between black and multi-racial African 
Americans: intra-racial differences in unobserved productivity-linked attributes and intra-racial 
differences in employer treatment. Differences in unobserved productivity-linked attributes may 
occur for a variety of reasons, for example, selection bias in the identity formation process, 
differential wage earning culture across identity sub-groups, or differences in ability. On the 
other hand, employers may not regard black and mixed-race African Americans as perfect 
substitutes in the discrimination process and thereby may treat them differently with respect to 
the wage earning opportunities that are made available to workers. 
As an identifying assumption, we assume a positive correlation between observable and 
unobservable productivity-linked attributes. Among men, black males earn 19 percent less than 
otherwise identical white males. By comparison, the labor market penalties for black-other, 
black-white, and black-white-other males are 23 percent, 9 percent, and 2 percent, respectively. 
Women have a similar pattern of residual wage differences: black (-10 percent), black-other (-13 
percent), black-white (1 percent), and black-white-other (-5 percent).  
Suppose these residual wage differences are consistent with higher unobserved 
productivity-linked attributes among black-white and black-white-other individuals relative to 
black individuals and higher unobserved productivity-linked attributes among black individuals 
relative to black-other individuals. If so, each element of the identity decomposition, that is, the 
characteristics, black advantage, and mixed-race disadvantage effects should i) have a negative 
effect on disparity between black and black-white persons, ii) have a negative effect on disparity 
between black and black-white-other persons, and iii) have a positive effect on disparity between 
black and black-other person.     18 
Suppose the patterns of male and female residual inequality are the result of differential 
market discrimination against black and mixed-race persons. If so, the characteristics and mixed-
race disadvantage effects will have opposite effects on intra-racial disparity. For example, if 
colorism exists the characteristics differential should have a positive effect on disparity between 
black individuals and each group of mixed-race persons; simultaneously, we should observe that 
the mixed-race disadvantage has a negative effect on intra-racial disparity. Relatively greater 
discrimination against mixed race persons will be the case if we observe that characteristic 
differences have a negative effect on intra-racial inequality while the mixed-race disadvantage 
has a positive effect on intra-racial inequality.  
  Nationally, for disparity between black individuals and all mixed-race persons, the male 
and female decompositions suggest that residual wage differences are the result of relatively 
higher discrimination against black African Americans. Table 9a shows that the unadjusted mean 
log weekly wage differentials for black and mixed-race African Americans are 0.16 for men and 
0.13 for women. The mean differences in wage covariates (“characteristics”) are responsible for 
a 0.19 differential for men and a 0.15 differential for women. Both male and female black 
advantage differentials are substantively small; relatively lower rates of return associated with 
black wage-earning attributes reduce the wage gap by about 1/10 percent. However, the negative 
mixed-race disadvantage suggests that higher than average rates of return to their wage-earning 
attributes raise the wages of mixed-race persons by 3 percent for males and 2 percent for 
females. Except for Northeastern males, the regional results display the same patterns, with 
similar differentials for the mixed-race disadvantage and black advantage. For Northeastern 
males, the identity decomposition is consistent with relatively higher unobserved productivity-
linked attributes among black individuals.   19 
[Insert Tables 9a, b] 
  Nationally and for each region, for disparity between black individuals and black-white 
persons, the male and female decompositions suggest that interracial residual wage differences 
are the result of relatively higher discrimination against black African Americans. Black men and 
women have wages that are 23 percent and 21 percent higher, respectively, than the wages of 
black-white men and women. The characteristics differentials explains more than 100 percent of 
the unadjusted wage differentials, accounting for wage differentials of 29 percent (males) and 27 
percent (females). There is no substantive black advantage; however, the black-white 
disadvantage reduces male inequality by 5.5 percent and reduces female inequality by 6 percent. 
For the West, the intraracial gaps between black and black-white male and female wages are 38 
and 35 percent and completely accounted for by higher wage covariates among black African 
Americans. No region shows a substantive black advantage, but the Northcentral, Northeastern, 
Southern regions show mild to large (in absolute value) negative black-white disadvantages. For 
example, preferential market treatment in the Northcentral region adds 9 percentage points to 
male black-white wages while preferential treatment in the South adds 14 percentage points to 
female black-white wages. 
  Nationally, colorism is also consistent with the identity decompositions between black 
and black-white-other African Americans. Black men and women have wages that are 4 percent 
higher than the wages of black-white-other men and women. The characteristics differentials 
explain at least 100 percent of the unadjusted wage differentials, accounting for wage 
differentials of 17 percent (males) and 4 percent (females). There is no substantive black 
advantage; however, the black-white disadvantage reduces male inequality by 13 percent and   20 
reduces female inequality by 0.59 percent. The regional results are inconsistent and there are 
only small numbers of observations of black-white-other persons in each region. 
  For both men and women, the national decomposition for black African Americans and 
black-other African Americans is inconsistent with colorism and suggests instead a pattern of 
preferential treatment for black women and relatively higher unobserved productivity-linked 
attributes among black men (Table 9b). Among men, the wage decomposition shows a 2 percent 
characteristics differential but a 7.4 percent unadjusted wage differential. Black-other 
disadvantage increases inequality by 6 percent. Among women, the wage decomposition shows a 
-1 percent characteristics differential but a 3 percent unadjusted wage differential; black-other 
disadvantage increases inequality by 4 percent. The regional identity decompositions are 
consistent with above average discrimination against black-other individuals, except for Western 
males and Northcentral females (higher unobserved attributes among black individuals) and 
Western females (colorism).   
V. Discussion 
  Our analysis has focused on four self-identified groups: black, black-other, black-white-
other, and black-white. Racial wage disparity is most consistent with weak colorism, while 
genotype disparity best describes racial employment differences. Black and black-other men and 
women receive weekly wages that are 21 percent lower and 10 percent lower, respectively, than 
the weekly wage received by otherwise identical native-born Non-Hispanic white males and 
females. Black and black-other men have a slightly lower (1.2 percent) labor force participation 
probability than white males, while all African American women have a labor force participation 
probability that is statistically identical to white women. Black and black-other men and women   21 
have probabilities of employment that are 5 percent lower and 3 percent lower, respectively, than 
the probabilities of employment of otherwise identical white males and females.             
       Black-white and black-white-other men and women receive weekly wages that are 8 
percent lower and statistically equal to, respectively, than the weekly wage received by otherwise 
identical white males and females. Black-white and black-white-other men and women have 
statistically equal labor force participation probabilities relative to white males and females. 
Black-white and black-white-other men and women have probabilities of employment that are 3 
percent lower and 4 percent lower, respectively, than the probabilities of employment of 
otherwise identical white males and females.  
There is a lower demand for labor for all African American men though the demand is 
lower for black and black-other males than it is for black-white and black-white other males. 
There is also evidence that the black African American labor supply curve is slightly to the left 
of the white labor supply curve. The evidence suggests a similar labor supply curve for African 
American and white women. The labor demand curve for black and black-other African 
American women is to the left of the labor demand curve for white women. The labor demand 
curve for black-white and black-white-other women is also to the left of the white labor demand 
curve above this wage. 
  Lastly, among African Americans, the wage data are not consistent with the hypothesis 
that black-mixed race wage disparity can be explained by differences in unobserved 
productivity-linked attributes. Instead, the evidence suggests that employers discriminate less 
against mixed-race persons than against black individuals.   22 
Notes 
 
1 An obvious convention is, “All persons with light skin color and European phenotype are 
white; otherwise, the person is non-white, for example, Black.” Over time, this binary descriptor 
would make “European” synonymous with “white” and “African” synonymous with “Black.”  
2 More colloquially, acting white often referred to as “Tomming,” that is, ideological passing for 
those who lack the appropriate physical features to pass. Nothing in the Darity, et al. model 
limits this identity strategy to a particular group, but if economic motives are the primary reasons 
for acting white, we should expect to see a greater presence among the least wealthy social 
group. Hence, African Toms are not permitted to pass as white, but they are permitted to pass as 
individuals among whites if they are sufficiently ideologically integrated into whiteness. 
3 See Golash-Boza and Darity, 2008 for an empirical analysis of these issues among Latinos. 
4 Similar economic studies include: Hersch (2007), which uses the 2003 New Immigrant Survey 
(NIS); Hersch (2006), which uses the NSBA, MCSUI, and the 1995 Detroit Area Study: Social 
Influence on Health: Stress, Racism, and Health Protective (DAS); and, Loury (2007, 2006), 
which uses the NSBA. The contemporary sociology (Keith and Herring, 1991; Herring, Keith, 
and Horton, 2004) and social psychology (Maddox, 2004; Blair, Judd, and Chapleau , 2004; 
Blair, Judd, Sadler, and Jenkins, 2002) literatures have documented strong empirical effects 
associated with skin tone colorism. For example, using the 1979-80 National Survey of Black 
Americans, Keith and Herring (1991) construct a continuous skin tone variable ranging from a 
value of 1 (very dark) to 5 (very light). In a series of beta coefficient regressions, they find that a 
one standardized unit increase in lightness is associated with greater years of education, higher 
occupational status, greater personal income, and greater family income.    23 
 
5 The absolute value of the skin shade coefficients depends on the method of estimation 
(ordinary least squares versus median regression), type of regression (standard versus ex ante), 
the number and type of wage covariates, and whether one is using the MCSUI or NSBA dataset.   24 
Bibliography 
 
Blair, Irene V., Charles M. Judd, Kristine M. Chapleau. (2004). “The Influence of Afrocentric 
Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing,” Psychological Science, 15(10):674-679 
 
Blair, I. V., C. M. Judd, M. S. Sadler, C. Jenkins. (2002). “The Role of Afrocentric Features in 
Person Perception: Judging by Features and Categories, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83:5-25 
 
Bodenhorn, Howard N. “Colorism, Complexion Homogamy and Household Wealth: Some 
Historical Evidence.” American Economic Review, 96, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 256-260.  
 
Bodenhorn, Howard N. “The Complexion Gap: The Economic Consequences of Color among 
Free African-Americans in the Rural Antebellum South.”   Advances in Agricultural Economic 
History 2 (2003), pp. 41-73.  
 
Bodenhorn, Howard (1999). "The Mulatto Advantage: The Biological Consequences of 
Complexion in Rural Antebellum Virginia." Lafayette College, unpublished working paper. 
 
Bodenhorn, Howard N. and Christopher S. Ruebeck. (2007). “Colourism and African-American 
Wealth: Evidence from the Nineteenth-Century South.” Journal of Population Economics 20:3 
(April): 599-620  
 
Bodenhorn, Howard N. and Christopher S. Ruebeck. (2003). “The Economics of Identity and the 
Endogeneity of Race.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. w9962. 
September.  
 
Cotton, Jeremiah. (1993). “Color or Culture?: Wage Differences Among Non-Hispanic Black 
Males, Hispanic Black Males and Hispanic White Males” The Review of Black Political 
Economy, 21(4) (Spring): 53-68. 
 
Darity, William, Jr.. (1989). “What's Left of the Economic Theory of Discrimination?” in S. 
Shulman and W. Darity Jr. The Question of Discrimination, Middletown: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1989, pp. 335-74. 
 
Darity, William, Jr., David Guilkey, and William Winfrey “Explaining Differences in Economic 
Performance Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in the USA: The Data Examined” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology vol. 55:4, October 1996 pp. 411-426. 
 
Ferguson, Ronald F.. (2006). “New Evidence on Why Black High Schoolers Get Accused of 
„Acting White?‟” Research Brief: Achievement Gap Initiative at Harvard University 
(September). 
 
Fordham, Signithia and John U. Ogbu. (1986). “Black students‟ school success: coping with the 
„burden of acting white‟: The Urban Review 18:176-206. 
   25 
Golash-Boza, Tanya and William Darity, Jr. (2008). “Latino racial choices: the effects of skin 
colour and discrimination on Latinos' and Latinas' racial self-identifications,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 31(5) (July): 899 - 934  
 
Goldsmith, Arthur, William A. Darity, Jr., and Darrick Hamilton. “Skin Shade and Inter-Ethnic 
Wage Differences: New Evidence”  
 
Herring, C.; V. M. Keith and H. D. Horton (2004); “Skin Deep: How Race and Complexion 
Matter in the Color-Blind Era”, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, IL. 
 
Hunter, M.; W. Allen and E. Telles (2001); “The Significance of Skin Color among African 
Americans and Mexican Americans.” African American Research Perspectives, Vol. 7(1), pp. 
173–184. 
 
Keith, Verna M. and Cedric Herring “Skin Tone and Stratification in the Black Community” 
American Journal of Sociology Vol. 97 1991 pp. 760-78. 
 
Linda Datcher Loury. (2007). “Am I Black Enough For You?: Schooling and Secular Change in 
Skin Tone Effects” Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 
 
Linda Loury, 2006. “Schooling, Skin Tone, and Attractiveness: Beauty Makes Skin Seem Deep,” 
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 
 
Maddox, K.B.  (2004). Perspectives on racial phenotypicality bias. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8, 383-401. 
 
Mason, P. L. (2004). “Annual Income, Hourly Wages, and Identity Formation Among Mexican 
Americans and other Latinos.” Industrial Relations. 43:4 (October):817-834. 
 
Mason, P., (1997). "Race, Culture, and Skill: Interracial Wage Differences Among African 
Americans, Latinos, and Whites.” Review of Black Political Economy 25(3) (Winter):5-40. 
 
Ruebeck, Christopher S., Susan L. Averett, Howard N. Bodenhorn. (2006). “Acting Out and 
Acting White: Risky Behavior and Academic Achievement of White, Black and Mixed-Race 
Youth.” National Bureau Economic Research: Working Paper 13793. 
  
Sollors, Werner. (1996). “Passing.” In Encyclopedia of African American Culture and History, 
Volume 4. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 2105 – 2109. 
 
Tyson, Karolyn, William Darity, Jr., and Domini R. Castellino. (2005). “It's Not "A Black 
Thing": Understanding the Burden of Acting White and Other Dilemmas of High Achievement,” 
American Sociological Review, 70(4) (August): 582-605.  
Table 1. Self-identity of African Americans, 2003-2007 
2003-2007  National  Northcentral  Northeast  South  West 
Native-born  0.8759  0.9429  0.6986  0.9137  0.8673 
Hispanic   0.0395  0.0191  0.1031  0.0197  0.0717 
Black   0.9711  0.9650  0.9664  0.9835  0.9193 
Black-American Indian,  
Native Alaskan/Asian/ 
Native Hawaiian  0.0086  0.0092  0.0083  0.0061  0.0225 
Black-white-American Indian,  
Native Alaskan/ Asian/ 
Native Hawaiian  0.0039  0.0053  0.0052  0.0019  0.0101 
Black-white  0.0165  0.0205  0.0202  0.0085  0.0482 
N  55,742  10,182  9,152  31,093  5,315 
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by social identity: 2001 - 2007 
  Black  
Black-American Indian, black-Native  




white-Native Hawaiian  Black-white 
Weekly wage   $666  $687  $682  $613 
Northeast  0.1782  0.1733  0.2402  0.2187 
Northcentral   0.1760  0.1900  0.2430  0.2201 
West  0.0899  0.2487  0.2476  0.2772 
South   0.5559  0.3880  0.2692  0.2839 
Metropolitan area, 5,000,000 or more  0.2742  0.2169  0.2843  0.2607 
Metropolitan area, 100,000 or less  0.1238  0.1054  0.1055  0.0959 
Married   0.3794  0.3825  0.4169  0.2915 
Divorced   0.1202  0.1421  0.0871  0.0935 
Widowed   0.0194  0.0005  0.0042  0.0126 
Seperated   0.0492  0.0311  0.0511  0.0374 
Never married   0.4317  0.4439  0.4407  0.5650 
Years of education   13.01  13.38  13.44  12.57 
Age   38.05  36.98  34.91  30.88 
Hispanic   0.0340  0.0955  0.2521  0.2838 
Fulltime employee   0.8122  0.7688  0.7200  0.7075 
Limitation on amount or type work    0.0327  0.0428  0.0508  0.0295 
Served in armed forces  0.0787  0.1107  0.0647  0.0568 
Job covered by union  0.1308  0.1343  0.0824  0.1367 
Firm size, 10 – 24 employees  0.0733  0.0768  0.1180  0.1035 
Firm size, 25 – 99 employees  0.1119  0.1160  0.0981  0.1392 
Firm size, 100 – 499 employees  0.1330  0.1098  0.1130  0.1506 
Firm size, 500 – 999 employees  0.0592  0.0687  0.0506  0.0504 
Firm size, 1000 or more employees  0.4693  0.4824  0.4596  0.3832 
Non-labor income ($1,000s)   2.2350  3.0374  2.3009  1.7924 
Self-employed  0.0442  0.0804  0.0913  0.0618 
Native-born   0.8771  0.8823  0.8223  0.8135 
N  53,665  636  265  1084 
N (wage)  50,541  592  291  1150 
 Table 3. Weekly wage differentials by nativity, ethnicity, and social identity: African American men, 2003-2007 
  National  Northcentral  Northeastern  South  West 
N  185,961    52,272        55,047    37,885   
F-statistic  5,437    1,848        1,651    1,117   
p-value  0.0000    0.0000        0.0000    0.0000   
R
2  0.4911    0.5148        0.4738    0.4696   
2 R   0.4910    0.5145        0.4735    0.4691   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Immigrant  -0.0988  0.0000  -0.0090  0.8100  -0.1327  0.0000  -0.1040  0.0000  -0.1089  0.0030 
Native-born Hispanic  -0.0045  0.8850  0.0619  0.5030  0.0040  0.9300  -0.0675  0.3100  0.0185  0.8070 
Black  -0.1893  0.0000  -0.1900  0.0000  -0.1689  0.0000  -0.1874  0.0000  -0.2116  0.0000 
Black-white  -0.0809  0.0130  -0.0484  0.4650  -0.0912  0.1920  -0.1076  0.0920  -0.0646  0.2940 
Black-other  -0.2296  0.0000  -0.3020  0.0020  -0.3232  0.0050  -0.1766  0.0260  -0.2056  0.0110 
Black-white-other  -0.0197  0.7740  -0.0337  0.8360  -0.2702  0.0480  0.1096  0.4510  0.0401  0.7240 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0    0.0005    0.0792    0.3081    0.1264    0.0170 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0   
0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0   
0.3683    0.2531    0.1842    0.8912    0.9409 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0   
0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0   
0.4176    0.9332    0.2402    0.1711    0.4164 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0   
0.0446    0.7522    0.0624    0.1816    0.5402 
  
 
Table 4. Weekly wage differentials by nativity, ethnicity, and social identity: African American women, 2003-2007 
  National  Northcentral  Northeast  South  West 
N  186,106    52,222    41,024    57,422    35,438   
F-statistic  4,842    1,562    1,248    1,571    958   
p-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
R
2  0.4620    0.4731    0.4774    0.4509    0.4479   
2 R   0.4619    0.4728    0.4770    0.4506    0.4475   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Immigrant  -0.0114  0.3540  0.0237  0.5790  -0.0501  0.0110  0.0070  0.7370  -0.0407  0.3100 
Native-born Hispanic  0.0400  0.1320  -0.0125  0.8780  0.0633  0.0920  0.0428  0.4630  -0.0365  0.5570 
Black  -0.0971  0.0000  -0.0784  0.0000  -0.0942  0.0000  -0.0991  0.0000  -0.0883  0.0000 
Black-white  0.0117  0.7010  -0.0176  0.7750  0.0520  0.3930  0.0953  0.1270  -0.0715  0.2200 
Black-other  -0.1306  0.0020  -0.1280  0.1820  -0.1415  0.1220  -0.1843  0.0070  0.0080  0.9350 
Black-white-other  -0.0499  0.4320  0.0523  0.6360  -0.0711  0.5760  -0.1571  0.2030  0.0196  0.9000 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0 
  0.0031    0.4598    0.1068    0.0090    0.6904 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0 
  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0 
  0.4324    0.6059    0.6061    0.2149    0.3294 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0 
  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0 
  0.3793    0.5762    0.3811    0.0670    0.5836 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0 
  0.6793    0.8552    0.5918    0.1360    0.4667 
 Table 5. Male laborforce participation, by social identity 
Participation rate  National  Northeast  Northcentral  South  West 
N  163,729    36,037    46,228    47,853    33,556   
Wald chi2     8,539    2,130    2,553    2,616    1,573   
p-value       0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Pseudo R2         0.1807    0.2094    0.1815    0.1736    0.1725   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Native-born Hispanic  0.0090  0.0790  0.0106  0.1400  0.0096  0.5570  0.0073  0.4690  0.0116  0.2770 
Immigrant  0.0074  0.0170  0.0043  0.4450  0.0135  0.0360  0.0053  0.3560  0.0142  0.0810 
Black  -0.0121  0.0000  -0.0149  0.0030  -0.0190  0.0000  -0.0084  0.0000  -0.0112  0.0860 
Black-other  -0.0028  0.7900      -0.0437  0.1900  0.0110  0.4210  -0.0023  0.9020 
Black-white-other  0.0027  0.8480  0.0263  0.0000      -0.0587  0.1780  0.0078  0.7090 
Black-white  0.0015  0.8140  -0.0136  0.4530  0.0206  0.0050  0.0021  0.8680  -0.0089  0.5000 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0    0.2024    0.0645    0.0376    0.2374    0.8875 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0    0.0000    0.0008    0.0000    0.0004    0.3782 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0    0.4099        0.3965    0.2999    0.6759 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0    0.0000        0.0000    0.0002    0.1560 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0    0.9380    0.0371        0.0833    0.5595 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0    0.9584    0.1138        0.1135    0.7131 
  
 
Table 6. Male probability of employment by social identity 
Employment rate  National  Northeast  Northcentral  South  West 
N  163,729    36,077    46,243    47,853    33,556   
Wald chi2     10,090    2,290    2,940    3,154    1,904   
p-value       0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Pseudo R2         0.1315    0.1369    0.1251    0.1382    0.1288   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Native-born Hispanic  0.0244  0.0030  0.0297  0.0280  0.0146  0.5770  0.0221  0.1360  0.0360  0.0360 
Immigrant  0.0189  0.0000  0.0177  0.0500  0.0315  0.0150  0.0172  0.0280  0.0162  0.2750 
Black  -0.0494  0.0000  -0.0602  0.0000  -0.0589  0.0000  -0.0372  0.0000  -0.0623  0.0000 
Black-other  -0.0216  0.2990  -0.0375  0.5810  -0.1205  0.0600  0.0358  0.0420  -0.0218  0.5510 
Black-white-other  -0.0063  0.8230  -0.0263  0.7070  0.0180  0.7710  -0.0796  0.1660  0.0370  0.1880 
Black-white  -0.0345  0.0310  -0.0694  0.1060  0.0084  0.7380  -0.0484  0.1440  -0.0383  0.1880 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0    0.2178    0.9465    0.1027    0.0875    0.1638 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0    0.1921    0.7221    0.2973    0.0155    0.3258 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0    0.4228    0.6261    0.8905    0.6237    0.1359 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0    0.0426    0.1204    0.9184    0.0361    0.1855 
 Table 7. Female laborforce participation, by social identity 
Participation rate  National  Northeast  Northcentral  South  West 
N  159,285    35,070    44,897    48,412    30,906   
Wald chi2     6,394    1,611    1,791    2,085    1,124   
p-value       0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Pseudo R2         0.0974    0.1152    0.0973    0.0974    0.0904   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Native-born Hispanic  0.0057  0.5680  0.0176  0.1600  -0.0277  0.3760  -0.0085  0.7340  0.0086  0.7110 
Immigrant  0.0022  0.6860  0.0110  0.1410  0.0155  0.1710  -0.0061  0.5580  -0.0183  0.4570 
Black  -0.0019  0.3480  -0.0091  0.0910  -0.0089  0.0370  0.0035  0.2120  -0.0021  0.7710 
Black-other  0.0024  0.8690  0.0112  0.7760  -0.0220  0.5030  0.0019  0.9380  0.0241  0.2500 
Black-white-other  0.0025  0.9090  -0.0668  0.3810  0.0294  0.1620  0.0424  0.0960  -0.0292  0.5810 
Black-white  -0.0092  0.4280  -0.0450  0.1160  0.0025  0.9000  0.0007  0.9710  0.0032  0.8910 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0    0.9060    0.3556    0.6184    0.8424    0.7066 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0    0.8157    0.0966    0.1846    0.6548    0.8368 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0    0.7770    0.6605    0.6696    0.9504    0.3202 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0    0.6276    0.1995    0.0707    0.4664    0.6028 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0    0.6511    0.7766    0.4186    0.3701    0.5344 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0    0.6963    0.0705    0.5286    0.6344    0.8033 
  
 
Table 8. Female probability of employment, by social identity 
Employment rate  National  Northeast  Northcentral  South  West 
N  159,285    35,070    44,897    48,412    30,906   
Wald chi2     7,135    1,632    2,138    2,374    1,170   
p-value       0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Pseudo R2         0.0858    0.0930    0.0918    0.0882    0.0755   
  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Native-born Hispanic  0.0157  0.1520  0.0277  0.0630  -0.0238  0.5120  0.0193  0.4050  -0.0025  0.9340 
Immigrant  0.0149  0.0110  0.0277  0.0010  0.0448  0.0000  -0.0043  0.7050  -0.0040  0.8670 
Black  -0.0320  0.0000  -0.0423  0.0000  -0.0485  0.0000  -0.0223  0.0000  -0.0277  0.0050 
Black-other  -0.0093  0.6570  0.0001  0.9990  -0.0351  0.4150  -0.0292  0.4480  0.0476  0.0420 
Black-white-other  -0.0756  0.0710  -0.2017  0.1190  0.0228  0.5710  -0.1347  0.1890  -0.0494  0.4970 
Black-white  -0.0299  0.0710  -0.0667  0.0750  -0.0057  0.8360  -0.0368  0.3030  -0.0099  0.7520 
Hypotheses    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value    p-value 
Equal identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b < 0    0.4883    0.3563    0.3097    0.5714    0.1745 
No identity effect 
bw = bwo = bo = b = 0    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0113 
Equal black effect 
bo = b < 0    0.2938    0.4814    0.7348    0.8771    0.0309 
No black effect 
bo = b = 0    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0019 
Equal black-white effect 
bw = bwo < 0    0.2713    0.2493    0.5920    0.3049    0.5903 
No black-white effect 
bw = bwo = 0    0.0109    0.0080    0.8657    0.1100    0.6967 
  
Table 9a. Oaxaca-Ransom wage decomposition: 
Black-only v. mixed-race African Americans 
Black - Mixed-race  Black v. black-white 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
National 
Black (N)  21840  28701  Black (N)  21840  28701 
Mixed-race (N)  919  1022  Black-white (N)  510  574 
Characteristics   0.1874  0.1547  Characteristics   0.2889  0.2719 
Black advantage   -0.0011  -0.0007  Black advantage   -0.0010  -0.0011 
Mixed-race disadvantage   -0.0275  -0.0225  Black-white disadvantage   -0.0548  -0.0597 
Unadjusted differential   0.1587  0.1315  Unadjusted differential   0.2332  0.2110 
Northeast 
Black (N)  3522  4691  Black (N)  3522  4691 
Mixed-race (N)  190  229  Black-white (N)  117  137 
Characteristics   0.1306  0.1996  Characteristics   0.1666  0.3535 
Black advantage   0.0007  -0.0014  Black advantage   -0.0009  -0.0019 
Mixed-race disadvantage   0.0409  -0.0293  Black-white disadvantage   -0.0438  -0.0699 
Unadjusted differential   0.1722  0.1690  Unadjusted differential   0.1219  0.2817 
Northcentral 
Black (N)  3995  5131  Black (N)  3995  5131 
Mixed-race (N)  194  244  Black-white (N)  115  137 
Characteristics   0.2358  0.2446  Characteristics   0.3689  0.3367 
Black advantage   -0.0009  -0.0003  Black advantage   -0.0019  -0.0002 
Mixed-race disadvantage   -0.0381  -0.0122  Black-white disadvantage   -0.0870  -0.0353 
Unadjusted differential   0.1968  0.2321  Unadjusted differential   0.2799  0.3012 
South 
Black (N)  12209  16559  Black (N)  12209  16559 
Mixed-race (N)  266  299  Black-white (N)  137  141 
Characteristics   0.1618  0.0480  Characteristics   0.3026  0.1822 
Black advantage   -0.0009  -0.0005  Black advantage   -0.0004  -0.0012 
Mixed-race disadvantage   -0.0384  -0.0190  Black-white disadvantage   -0.0305  -0.1420 
Unadjusted differential   0.1224  0.0285  Unadjusted differential   0.2717  0.0390 
West 
Black (N)  2114  2320  Black (N)  2114  2320 
Mixed-race (N)  269  250  Black-white (N)  141  159 
Characteristics   0.2789  0.2814  Characteristics   0.3848  0.3516 
Black advantage   -0.0043  -0.0039  Black advantage   -0.0047  -0.0012 
Mixed-race disadvantage   -0.0300  -0.0410  Black-white disadvantage   -0.0049  -0.0024 
Unadjusted differential   0.2446  0.2365  Unadjusted differential   0.3752  0.3480 
  
Table 9b. Oaxaca-Ransom wage decomposition: 
Black-only v. mixed-race African Americans 
Black v. black-white other  Black v. black-other 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
National 
Black (N)  21840  28701  Black (N)  21840  28701 
Black-white-other (N)  126  139  Black-other (N)  283  309 
Characteristics   0.1664  0.0427  Characteristics   0.0174  -0.0122 
Black advantage   -0.0006  -0.0001  Black advantage   0.0004  0.0005 
Black-white-other disadvantage   -0.1258  -0.0059  Black-other disadvantage   0.0564  0.0399 
Unadjusted differential   0.0400  0.0368  Unadjusted differential   0.0742  0.0282 
Northeast 
Black (N)  3522  4691  Black (N)  3522  4691 
Black-white-other (N)  32  29  Black-other (N)  41  63 
Characteristics   0.2335  -0.0306  Characteristics   -0.0548  -0.0248 
Black advantage   0.0005  -0.0001  Black advantage   0.0012  0.0006 
Black-white-other disadvantage   0.1661  0.0144  Black-other disadvantage   0.1494  0.0519 
Unadjusted differential   0.4001  -0.0164  Unadjusted differential   0.0958  0.0277 
Northcentral 
Black (N)  3995  5131  Black (N)  3995  5131 
Black-white-other (N)  21  47  Black-other (N)  58  60 
Characteristics   0.2278  0.2335  Characteristics   -0.0247  0.0429 
Black advantage   -0.0002  -0.0007  Black advantage   0.0012  0.0006 
Black-white-other disadvantage   0.0101  -0.0497  Black-other disadvantage   0.1205  0.0947 
Unadjusted differential   0.2377  0.1831  Unadjusted differential   0.0970  0.1381 
South 
Black (N)  12209  16559  Black (N)  12209  16559 
Black-white-other (N)  31  35  Black-other (N)  98  123 
Characteristics   0.1639  -0.0954  Characteristics   -0.0309  -0.0654 
Black advantage   -0.0004  0.0001  Black advantage   -0.0001  0.0006 
Black-white-other disadvantage   -0.2491  0.1190  Black-other disadvantage   0.0211  0.1065 
Unadjusted differential   -0.0856  0.0238  Unadjusted differential   -0.0098  0.0417 
West 
Black (N)  2114  2320  Black (N)  2114  2320 
Black-white-other (N)  42  28  Black-other (N)  86  63 
Characteristics   0.1682  0.0912  Characteristics   0.1622  0.1880 
Black advantage   -0.0024  -0.0006  Black advantage   0.0026  -0.0023 
Black-white-other disadvantage   -0.0721  0.1096  Black-other disadvantage   0.0216  -0.1537 
Unadjusted differential   0.0937  0.2001  Unadjusted differential   0.1865  0.0320 
 